St. John's Law Review
Volume 41
Number 4 Volume 41, April 1967, Number 4

Article 12

CPLR 214(3): Equitable Estoppel v. Statute of Limitations in
Conversion
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1967]

NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE
ARTICLE

CPLR 214(3):

2-

645

LIMITATIONS OF TIME

Equitable estoppel v. statute of limitations in

conversion.
In General Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa,' plaintiff sued to recover
a sum of money alleged to have been converted out of petty cash
funds by defendant, its head bookkeeper. Defendant interposed
the three-year statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. The
plaintiff contended that this defense was barred by reason of the
doctrine of equitable estoppel. Reversing the appellate division,
the Court of Appeals upheld this contention and held that the2
plaintiff was entitled to litigate the issue of equitable estoppel.
The Court relied upon the maxim that no man may take advantage
of his own wrong 8 and upon Section 17-103(4) (b) of the
General Obligations Law which allows the court to preclude the
defense of statute of limitations if its use would be inequitable.
However, the Court noted that, at trial, the defendant could prevent
the plaintiff from successfully pleading estoppel by showing that
the plaintiff's own negligence and acquiescence caused the delay
in discovering the conversion.
Prior cases have refused to allow defendants to interpose4
the statute of limitations where it would be inequitable to do so.
These cases presented either some affirmative misrepresentation
by the defendant which induced plaintiff to refrain from bringing
an action, or some conduct which fraudulently concealed the cause
of action from plaintiff's knowledge.5
General Stencils appears to be the first case in which equitable
estoppel was employed to defeat the statute of limitations in an
action for conversion. It would seem that this holding will provide
a wide avenue for plaintiffs to side-step the defense of statute of
1

18 N.Y.Zd 125, 219 N.E.2d 169, 272 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1966).

2 It should be noted that plaintiff did not contend that the statute had
been tolled by the concealment or that it had not begun to run until discovery
of the conversion. Instead, reliance was placed solely upon the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. The probable reason for this reliance was that prior case
law held that concealment neither affected the accrual of a cause of action
for conversion nor tolled the statute of limitations. See Guild v. Hopkins,
271 App. Div. 234, 245, 63 N.Y.S.2d 522, 532 (1st Dep't 1946).
3 Gls v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232 (1959).
4 See, e.g., Erbe v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 13 App. Div. 2d 211,
214 N.Y.S.2d 849 (4th Dep't 1961) (breach of fiduciary duty of trustees);
Dodds v. McColgan, 229 App. Div. 273, 241 N.Y. Supp. 584 (1st Dep't 1930)
(action for services rendered); Safrin v. Friedman, 27 Misc. 2d 687, 96
N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), aff'd, 277 App. Div. 1138, 101
N.Y.S.2d 216 (2d Dep't 1950) (action for wages due). But see, Scheuer v.
Scheuer, 308 N.Y. 447, 126 N.E.2d 555 (1955) wherein equitable estoppel
was held not to apply in an action to impress a constructive trust.
r1 Wa xssm, KORN & Mnim, Nmv YORK CIVIL PRAcTcE 1201.13
(1965).
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limitations in conversion actions, since in many such actions there
is necessarily present an affirmative act of concealment on the
defendant's part which would give rise to equitable estoppel. It
must be pointed out, however, that the plaintiff must not be guilty
of negligence in failing to discover his cause of action, since this
will vitiate the plea of equitable estoppel.
ARTICLE 3-

JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANcE AND CHOICE

OF COURT
CPLR 302(a)(1): May be applicable to non-commercial transactions of business.
There seems to be a conflict as to whether CPLR 302(a) (1)
is applicable to non-commercial as well as to commercial transactions
of business. In Willis v. Willis,6 the supreme court, New York
County, held that a separation agreement entered into in New
York was not a "transaction of business" within the meaning of
CPLR 302 (a) (1).
The court7 said that this section encompassed
only "commercial" transactions.
However, the supreme court, Nassau County, in Todd v.
Todd,8 while holding service under CPLR 308 invalid, nevertheless
noted that there "may well be a basis for maintaining the action
in New York, for the separation agreement was apparently entered
into in New York ..
," 9
To resolve this conflict, a clarification by the Court of Appeals
is needed. In view of the recent amendment to CPLR 302(a) (3)
expanding jurisdiction in the area of tortious activity, it would
appear that the legislature intended CPLR 302 to approach the
constitutional limit. Therefore, it would seem most likely that
the Court of Appeals will eventually construe "transaction of
business" to include both commercial and non-commercial transactions. By so doing, the New York courts will be given as
broad a jurisdiction as is possible under the present terms of CPLR
302(a) (1).
CPLR 308(3):

Court warns plaintiffs about "sewer service."

In Todd v. Todd,10 the supreme court has warned plaintiffs
to exercise care in their choice of process servers. In that case,
the court vacated substituted service and dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction, since it was conclusively demonstrated that
I 42 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct N.Y. County 1964).
7 Id. at 475, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
8 51 Misc. 2d 94, 272 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct Nassau County 1966).
9 Id. at 96, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
10 51 Misc. 2d 94, 272 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct Nassau County 1966).

